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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE STANDARD OF FRAUD
REQUIRED UNDER THE FRAUD
RULE IN LETTER OF CREDIT LAW
GAO XIANG* AND ROSS P. BUCKLEY**
National courts have required different standards of fraud to justify
non-payment, or restraint of payment, under a letter of credit. The
United Nations Commission on Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has
adopted its own position. The issue is far from settled in any legal
system. Based on an analysis of the law in the United States, United
Kingdom, Canada and Australia, and under the Convention, this article proposes a standard that is a distinct improvement on the various standards applied around the world and suggests a means for its
implementation.

The fraud rule allows the issuer of a letter of credit or a court to
disrupt the payment of a letter of credit when fraud is involved. The
raison d’etre of letters of credit is to provide an absolute assurance of
payment to a seller, provided the seller presents documents that comply with the terms of the credit. The fraud rule thus goes to the very
heart of the letter of credit obligation. The fraud rule is necessary to
limit the activities of fraudsters, but its scope must be carefully circumscribed so as not to deny commercial utility to an instrument that
1
exists to serve as an assurance of payment.
This article explores the kind of fraud required to invoke the
fraud rule or, in other words, what does fraud mean under the fraud
rule in the law governing letters of credit? This is a challenging quesCopyright © 2003 by Gao Xiang and Ross P. Buckley
* Judge, Supreme People’s Court, People’s Republic of China; Senior Fellow, Tim Fischer Centre for Global Trade and Finance, Bond University, Australia.
** Professor and Executive Director, Tim Fischer Centre for Global Trade and Finance,
Bond University, Australia. Our thanks to our able research assistant, James Walsh, for his assistance with the footnotes.
1. The policy tension behind the fraud rule was well expressed by Justice Le Dain in the
leading Canadian case, Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angelica–Whitewear Ltd., [1987] D.L.R. 161,
168 (Can. 1987), in these terms:
The potential scope of the fraud exception must not be a means of creating serious uncertainty and lack of confidence in the operation of letter of credit transactions; at the
same time the application of the principle of autonomy must not serve to encourage or
facilitate fraud in such transactions.
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tion because fraud is an “inherently pliable concept.”2 Some argue
that the fraud rule must be applied in a strict fashion, or in cases
where only egregious fraud is involved. These commentators emphasize that the letter of credit is a unique commercial device that must
be protected from simple contract disputes, which are often difficult
to distinguish from certain fraud claims.3 Others favor a more flexible
4
approach to the concept.
This article investigates how this question has been answered in
the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, and under
the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and
5
Standby Letters of Credit (the UNCITRAL Convention).
I. THE POSITION IN THE UNITED STATES
A large number of letter of credit fraud cases have been decided
in the United States. In addition, Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) contains state-of-the-art provisions with respect to
the fraud rule. Therefore, the U.S. position deserves much attention.
To facilitate the discussion, the U.S. position will be examined in
three categories: the pre–U.C.C. position, the Prior U.C.C. Article 5
position, and the Revised U.C.C. Article 5 position.6

2. Gerald T. McLaughlin, Letters Of Credit and Illegal Contracts: The Limits of the Independence Principle, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1197, 1203 (1989).
3. For example, in a commercial letter of credit transaction, “it is not always easy to determine whether an alleged discrepancy between the description of the goods in the documents
and their actual nature is indicative of a fraud. Unless there is a blatant fraud, the banker cannot assert the deficiency of the goods against the seller.” ANTHONY G. GUEST, BENJAMIN’S
SALE OF GOODS 1716 (5th ed. 1997).
4. See, e.g., Greg A. Fellinger, Letters of Credit: The Autonomy Principle and the Fraud
Exception, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 4, 22 (1990).
5. The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits are silent on the issue of fraud. See THE UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE
FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993 Revision, ICC Publication No. 500).
6. Articles of the U.C.C. are revised by a drafting committee specifically appointed for the
task by the two sponsoring organizations of the U.C.C.: the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute. For a list of the jurisdictions
that have adopted Article 5, see Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts: U.C.C. Article 5—
Letters of Credit, available at http://nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fsucca5.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2003) and Article 5: Letters of Credit, available at http://
www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a5 (last visited Mar. 2, 2003).
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A. Pre-U.C.C. Position
1. Pre-Sztejn Cases. The seminal case on the fraud rule in let7
ter of credit law was Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp.
While a U.S. decision, Sztejn has influenced and shaped the fraud rule
in virtually all jurisdictions worldwide. Before Sztejn was decided, a
number of letter of credit cases in the United States touched on the
issue of fraud, but none considered the fraud rule in detail. Little discussion appeared in those cases about what kind of fraud might invoke the fraud rule. One of the few passages mentioning the issue
was the dissenting judgment of Justice Cardozo in Maurice O’Meara
Co. v. National Park Bank,8 which read, in part:
We are to bear in mind that this controversy . . . arises between the
bank and a seller who has misrepresented the security upon which
advances are demanded. . . . I cannot accept the statement of the
majority opinion that the bank was not concerned with any question as to the character of the paper. If that is so, the bales tendered
might have been rags instead of paper, and still the bank would have
been helpless, though it had knowledge of the truth, if the docu9
ments tendered by the seller were sufficient on their face.

This paragraph shows that, in the view of Justice Cardozo, fraud under the fraud rule in the law governing letters of credit means misrepresentation. Cardozo’s statement later in the paragraph that “the
bales tendered might have been rags instead of paper,” was suggesting that, to invoke the fraud rule, a misrepresentation might have to
go as far as complete non–performance of the contract, a kind of
10
gross misrepresentation.
Some eminent commentators of the time seemed to take a different and more flexible view, however. In their view, the issuer
should be allowed to dishonor a draft drawn under a letter of credit
where the goods did not conform to the description of the superficially regular documents even if the misrepresentation was made innocently. This view was founded on the idea that, under such circumstances, “the seller has failed as effectively as in the case of outright

7. 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).
8. 146 N.E. 636 (N.Y. 1925) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 641 (emphasis added).
10. Fellinger has suggested that “Justice Cardozo’s dissenting opinion . . . envisions a scenario where there is a total lack of consideration in the underlying sales contract . . . .”
Fellinger, supra note 4, at 11. See also Gordon B. Graham & Benjamin Geva, Standby Credits
in Canada, 9 CAN. BUS. L.J. 180, 197 (1984).
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fraud to give the bank what the parties contemplated, that is, control
over merchandise of a specific description.”11 Some commentators
went further and suggested that “the issuing bank may defend the action brought by the seller on the ground of inferiority of quality . . . .”12 These suggestions have been classified as the “breach of
warranty or innocent misrepresentation standard” and have been re13
jected by modern commentators.
2. The Test of Sztejn. In Sztejn, Justice Shientag applied the
fraud rule where the dispute was not, in the Justice’s words, “between
the buyer and seller concerning a mere breach of warranty regarding
the quality of the merchandise; [but where] the seller has intentionally
failed to ship any goods ordered by the buyer . . . where the merchandise is not merely inferior in quality but consists of worthless rub14
bish.”
Despite the use of the word “intentionally,” divergent views have
emerged among courts and commentators on the standard of fraud
adopted in Sztejn. Some say Sztejn set forth a standard of “inten15
tional fraud.” Some have read it more narrowly: “Sztejn on its facts
exhibits an ‘egregious fraud’ standard.”16 But others would argue that
the apparently severe standard in Sztejn arose out of its special procedural context: a motion to dismiss. If the case had been heard in
the context of an equitable injunction, Sztejn would have set forth “a
17
more flexible equitable standard of fraud.” Still others are of the
view that the “judgment [in Sztejn] does not tell what degree of
knowledge of fraud is necessary to justify the issuing bank in refusing
to pay . . . .”18

11. Phillip W. Thayer, Irrevocable Credits in International Commerce: Their Legal Effects,
37 COLUM. L. REV. 1327, 1336–37 (1937).
12. Morton C. Campbell, Guaranties and Suretyship Phases of Letters of Credit, 85 U. PA.
L. REV. 261, 275 (1937).
13. Edward L. Symons, Jr., Letters of Credit: Fraud, Good Faith and the Basis for Injunctive
Relief, 54 TUL. L. REV. 338, 340 (1980).
14. See Sztejn, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634–35 (emphasis added).
15. See Symons, supra note 13, at 361.
16. See Fellinger, supra note 4, at 12; Henry Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J. 596, 603 (1978).
17. Herbert A. Getz, Enjoining the International Standby Letter of Credit: The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases, 21 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189, 206 (1980).
18. Maurice Megrah, Risk Aspects of the Irrevocable Documentary Credit, 24 ARIZ. L.
REV. 255, 258 (1982).
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It has been suggested that one year later, in another letter of
credit fraud case, Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank v. National City
19
Bank of New York, Justice Shientag himself provided some hint of
20
what he had meant in Sztejn. In Asbury Park, Silverman Brothers
entered into contracts to purchase clothing from the U.S. Army.
Payment was to be made by way of letters of credit. At the buyer’s
request, the plaintiff itself issued letters of credit in favor of the sellers, but as the amount involved in the transaction was large, the seller
required further letters of credit to be issued by other banks. The
plaintiff accordingly applied to the defendant for it to issue letters of
credit. Just prior to the expiration of the credits, the plaintiff requested that the defendant not honor any more drafts drawn under
the credits, but the defendant made the payment in disregard of the
plaintiff’s request because it found that the documents were in compliance with the terms of the credits.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages it sustained, alleging that the seller and the buyer were using the letters of credit to defraud the plaintiff, and that the defendant knew it. The plaintiff
claimed that: (1) when the seller shipped the goods to the buyer, it
made out drafts on the defendant, but instead of presenting the drafts
for payment, the seller held them as a sort of guaranty on its open account and did not present them until it appeared that the buyer would
be unable to pay the account; (2) such use of the credits had not been
contemplated by its agreement with the buyer; and (3) the defendant
knew that its credits were being used as guaranty even before the
plaintiff requested that the defendant honor no more drafts. Justice
Shientag rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and observed:
The authorities . . . agree that the letters of credit are contracts
which are independent of the contract of purchase between the
seller and the purchaser unless there was such a fraud on the part of
the seller that there were no goods shipped . . . .
It therefore follows that a notice given by the correspondent bank
[the plaintiff] to the issuing bank [the defendant] to the effect that
the former was defrauded by either the buyer, the seller or both, is
ineffective to void or suspend the operation of the letter of credit.
Any other rule would destroy the effectiveness of this valuable
commercial device. The common–law fraud action is one of the
most difficult to prove, and the issuing bank cannot be expected to

19. 35 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942).
20. JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY
CREDITS §§ 7-45–7-46 (rev. ed. 1996); Symons, supra note 13, at 362.
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evaluate the soundness of the correspondent bank’s claim. Thus, in
the instant case it is not at all clear whether the plaintiff could
prove a cause of action for fraud against the Army or Silverman
Brothers or both. It would be improper to hold up the payment of
drafts by the issuing bank pending the result of such litigation be21
tween the correspondent bank and the buyer or seller.

If Asbury Park can lend assistance to the interpretation of Sztejn, it
might have suggested that Justice Shientag would have applied the
fraud rule only in such situations where no goods are shipped, common–law fraud is involved, or the seller has intentionally failed to
ship any goods ordered by the buyer. It is therefore open to question
whether Justice Shientag would apply the fraud rule if the beneficiary’s misconduct were less serious.
B. Prior U.C.C. Article 5 Position
Although the prior fraud provision in U.C.C. Article 5, Section
114(2), codified Sztejn, it disappointed in that “[n]either the Code nor
its comments [gave] any hint as to what type of fraud [gave] the bank
22
an option to pay or not to pay under this section.” As a result, a
number of standards of fraud were suggested in the cases applying the
Prior U.C.C. Article 5.
1. Egregious Fraud. The term “egregious” is not commonly
23
used by courts in connection with letter of credit fraud. Rather, it
represents a standard advocated by some commentators.24 The elements of egregious fraud are not entirely clear, but the term has been
used to denote very serious misconduct in the context of letter of
21. See Asbury Park and Ocean Grove Bank, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 988–89 (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added). It should be noted that Sztejn was among the authorities mentioned by the Justice.
22. West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (W.D. Pa. 1976). But
cf. Symons, supra note 13, at 340: “A careful review of Sztejn and other pre–Code cases, the
wording and cross references in section 5–114, and the pervasive standard of good faith in the
U.C.C.—defined in section 1–201(19) as ‘honesty in fact’—reveal that the middle ground standard, intentional fraud, is the proper interpretation of the pre–Code cases and the U.C.C.”
23. Symons, supra note 13, at 346. Symons did a LEXIS search of “egregious fraud” on
June 4, 1979 in both the General Federal and All States libraries. Two cases were found in the
former library and three were found in the latter. Id. at n.25. This author did the same search
on July 29, 1998 and altogether ten cases were found. On June 4, 2002, the author did another
search using “letters of credit and egregious fraud” in the library of “Federal & State Cases
Law;” only 13 items were found.
24. E.g., Harfield, supra note 16; Jack B. Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations (Pt. 1), 94 BANKING L.J. 424 (1977); Jack B. Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and
Frustrations (Pt. 2), 94 BANKING L.J. 493 (1977).
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credit transactions. One suggestion is that egregious fraud means “a
flagrant violation of the beneficiary’s obligation under the letter of
credit.”25 Another is that egregious fraud is a kind of “outrageous
26
conduct which shocks the conscience of the court.” Some commentators have used “gross fraud” interchangeably with “egregious
fraud.”27 In sum, under the standard of egregious fraud “simple intent
to deceive is not sufficient; it is the extreme or outrageous nature of
28
the fraud” that matters.
One oft–mentioned case for the standard of egregious fraud is
29
Intraworld Industries v. Girard Trust Bank. Intraworld involved a
contract under which a luxury Swiss hotel was leased. The applicant,
the lessee, obtained a standby letter of credit in favor of the beneficiary, the lessor, to guarantee rental payment in advance. Under the
letter of credit, the issuer promised to pay a draft accompanied by the
beneficiary’s signed statement to the effect that the applicant had not
paid an instalment of rent due under the lease.
When a dispute arose and the beneficiary presented a draft accompanied by a statement conforming to the terms of the letter of
credit, the applicant attempted to enjoin the bank from paying the
beneficiary, alleging that although the beneficiary’s supporting documents on their face conformed to the credit, they were false and
fraudulent on the following grounds: (1) no rent was due because the
beneficiary had terminated the lease, which the beneficiary’s statement failed to disclose; and (2) the beneficiary was not seeking rent at
all but rather seeking the stipulated penalty.
After a hearing, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that
the facts were not as the applicant had claimed. Conversely, the court
found that correspondence had been exchanged between the parties’
lawyers when the dispute arose and that one of the letters from the
applicant’s counsel to the beneficiary’s counsel stated that “[i]f the
transfer of the rent . . . should not be made in timely fashion, your client . . . is at liberty to obtain payment by way of [the letter of

25. Harfield, supra note 16, at 602. But in the same article Harfield also used the phrase of
“actual and intentional fraud” to define the “egregious” fraud he was discussing. Id. at 604.
26. Symons, supra note 13, at 348.
27. Id.
28. Kerry L. Macintosh, Letters of Credit: Dishonour When a Required Document Fails to
Conform to the Section 7–507(b) Warranty, 6 J.L. & COM. 1, 6 (1986).
29. 336 A.2d 316 (Pa. 1975).
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credit].”30 The court also found that the underlying contract provided
that if the applicant should fail to pay the rent, the beneficiary could
not only draw under the letter of credit, but also terminate the lease
immediately without further notice. Accordingly, the court rejected
the applicant’s claim for an injunction against payment of the letter of
credit, reasoning that:
In light of the basic rule of the independence of the issuer’s engagement and the importance of this rule to the effectuation of the
purposes of the letter of credit, we think that the circumstances
which will justify an injunction against honor must be narrowly
limited to situations of fraud in which the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes
of the independence of the issuer’s obligation would no longer be
served. A court of equity has limited duty of “guaranteeing that
[the beneficiary] not be allowed to take unconscientious advantage
of the situation and run off with plaintiff’s money on a pro forma
31
declaration which has absolutely no basis in fact.”

One case actually having mentioned the term “egregious fraud” is
32
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co.
Here, the plaintiff and a real estate developer entered into a mortgage loan agreement under which the developer committed to borrow
from the plaintiff a large sum of money. The defendant issued a
standby letter of credit in favor of the plaintiff to satisfy one of the
terms of the agreement—that the developer would have to pay the
plaintiff a sum as liquidated damages if it failed to take up the loan.
The sole condition for payment of the letter of credit was that the
drafts were to be accompanied by a signed statement of the plaintiff
that the liquidated damages were due. When the developer failed to
take up the loan, the plaintiff presented to the defendant the draft accompanied by the required document, but it was dishonored.
The plaintiff sued for wrongful dishonor. The defendant asserted
several defenses, but none of them alleged that the plaintiff had practiced fraud. The Supreme Court of Connecticut made its decision for
the plaintiff on the basis that no fraud was involved in the case, stating:
Only in rare situations of egregious fraud would . . . [Prior U.C.C.
Article 5, Section–114] have justified the issuer, on the facts presented here, in going behind apparently regular, conforming docu30. Id. at 321.
31. Id. at 324–25 (citing Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 356 F. Supp.
991, 999 (N.D. Ga. 1973)) (emphasis added).
32. 378 A.2d 562 (Conn. 1977).
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ments; such fraud “must be narrowly limited to situations [of fraud]
in which the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of the independence of
the issuer’s obligation would no longer be served” . . . . There is no
such evidence in the record of this case, and the [lower] court correctly found that the documentation presented by New York Life
33
complied fully with the terms of the letter of credit.

The court of New York Life Insurance followed the reasoning of Intraworld. Taking both cases together, under the standard of “egregious fraud,” the fraud rule might be applied only in situations where
“the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer’s
obligation would no longer be served,” or where the letter of credit
was called upon with “absolutely no basis in fact.”
In practice, the fraud rule has rarely been activated when the
standard of egregious fraud has been applied. Ironically, the standard
of egregious fraud has normally been cited in cases where no fraud
would have been found to have been involved whatever standard of
fraud is applied. For example, in Intraworld, the court properly denied the request for an injunction because the letter of credit was
used for precisely the purpose for which it was generated—to guaran34
tee payment of the advance rent as liquidated damages. In New
York Life Insurance, as fraud was not even mentioned as a defense,
the statements of the court relating to the standard of fraud were
mere dicta. Therefore, it can be seen that the standard of egregious
fraud has, in fact, become the term used by those courts and commentators who regard a letter of credit “as something akin to a claim
check redeemable at a bank’s cash vault.”35 These courts and commentators have to recognize the rationale for the existence of the
fraud rule but are very reluctant to allow interference with the payment of a letter of credit due to the application of the fraud rule.
2. Intentional Fraud. The idea that intentional fraud can invoke the fraud rule was articulated in the case of NMC Enterprises v.
36
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., where the underlying contract
was for the purchase of stereo receivers. A commercial letter of
credit was issued in favor of the defendant to finance the purchase.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 567 (citing Intraworld, 336 A.2d at 324–25) (emphasis added).
See Intraworld, 336 A.2d at 316.
Justice, Pt. 1, supra note 24, at 424.
14 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
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The plaintiff, the buyer, sought a preliminary injunction restraining
the defendant from presenting for payment or negotiating any drafts
under the letter of credit.
The affidavit of the plaintiff’s president averred that the technical performance specifications for the receivers were substantially
below those specified in brochures that formed the basis of the bargain. These allegations were confirmed by a testing laboratory. One
critical element of the case was an allegation that one of the beneficiary’s officers had admitted the seller was aware of such non–conformity prior to the execution of the contract.
The New York Supreme Court, while acknowledging that questions as to quality or condition of the goods could not form the basis
of the request for an injunction, nevertheless granted the requested
injunction and stated:
Where no innocent third parties are involved and where the documents or the underlying transaction are tainted with intentional
fraud, the draft need not be honored by the bank, even though the
documents conform on their face and the court may grant injunc37
tive relief restraining such honor.

Another oft–mentioned case applying the standard of intentional
38
fraud is American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
where American Bell International (Bell) contracted with the Ministry of War of the Imperial Government of Iran (the Imperial Government) to provide the latter with consulting services and telecommunications equipment. A down payment was involved, and,
according to the contract, Bell’s liability to return this down payment
would be reduced in proportion to the work completed. In order to
protect the down payment, the Imperial Government required Bell to
establish a bank guarantee issued by Bank Iranshahr. The bank
guarantee was counter–guaranteed by a standby letter of credit from
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company. According to this letter of
credit, payment to Bank Iranshahr would be triggered by a statement

37. Id. at 1429 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Taken away from the facts of
the case, this paragraph is sound and well reasoned. Against the factual background of the case,
however, the result of the case is disappointing as “the dispute between the customer and the
beneficiary appears to have been a classic case involving breach of warranty, and it is clear that
an injunction should not be granted in such a case.” Justice, Pt. 2, supra note 24, at 502–03.
38. 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). For special treatment of the case, see Patrick C.
Reed, A Reconsideration of American Bell Int’l Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 301 (1981).
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from Bank Iranshahr to the effect that it had received a call for payment under the guarantee from the Imperial Government.
Subsequently, the Imperial Government in Iran was replaced by
the Islamic Republic, and Bank Iranshahr made demands under the
standby letter of credit for payment of the remaining balance of the
down payment. Bell filed an action in the Supreme Court of New
York, New York County for a preliminary injunction against honoring the demand, claiming, inter alia, that the demand was fraudulent
because the old and new Iranian governments had repudiated the underlying contract. The new Islamic Republic nevertheless caused
Bank Iranshahr to demand payment under the letter of credit, thus
asserting rights in a transaction it had otherwise repudiated. Rejecting Bell’s argument, Judge MacMahon said:
Even if we accept the proposition that the evidence does show repudiation, plaintiff is still far from demonstrating the kind of evil
intent necessary to support a claim of fraud. Surely, plaintiff cannot
contend that every party who breaches or repudiates his contract is
for that reason culpable of fraud. . . . [T]he evidence is ambivalent
as to whether the purported repudiation results from nonfraudulent
economic calculation or from fraudulent intent to mulct Bell. . . . On
the evidence before us, fraud is no more inferable than an economically rational decision by the government to recoup its down
39
payment. . . .

It seems that the standard of intentional fraud requires a misrepresentation made knowingly or recklessly with the intention of inducing
another to rely thereon. It is thus similar to common law fraud, requiring: (1) a false presentation of the fact; (2) knowledge or belief on
the part of the defrauder; and (3) an intention to induce the other
party to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepre40
sentation. If cases of common law fraud are treated as equivalent to
cases of intentional fraud, the number of cases supporting the stan41
dard of intentional fraud is significant.
39. American Bell Int’l, 474 F. Supp. at 425 (emphasis added).
40. Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 347 (H.L. 1889) (Lord Herschell).
41. It has been said that “[i]ntentional fraud could be shown by establishing the common
law elements of fraud.” Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 934 F.2d 695, 698
(6th Cir. 1991). On June 4, 2002, the day when the search for “egregious fraud” was done, this
author also did searches in the same library for the other standards of fraud discussed here using
the following phrases: “letters of credit and intentional fraud,” “letters of credit and common
law fraud,” “letters of credit and letter of credit fraud,” “letters of credit and flexible fraud,”
and “letters of credit and constructive fraud,” and found 61, 284, 42, 8, and 93 items, respectively. Although these figures could not necessarily reflect what standards of fraud courts actually had applied in the cases and might reflect only the frequency courts had used the terms in
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The critical requirement for the application of the standard of intentional/common law fraud (treating the two as one) is to prove the
fraudster’s intention or state of mind to defraud, which is notoriously
42
difficult. This is especially so in a standby letter of credit scenario
where few documents are required to effect a call on a letter of credit.
If the fraudster’s intention can be proven, however, the standard of
intentional fraud does not seem to be as high as that of egregious
fraud. So, in NMC Enterprises the fraud rule was applied because the
court was satisfied the buyer had proven that the seller knew of the
inferior quality of the goods yet had induced the purchaser into the
contract and drawn on the letter of credit.43
Given that the purpose of the fraud rule is to stop dishonest
beneficiaries from abusing the letter of credit system, the standard of
intentional fraud seems to be an appropriate one, even though the
term is a general one and does not specifically reflect the characteristics of letters of credit.
3. Letter of Credit Fraud. The concept of “letter of credit
fraud” was fashioned in Emery–Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hos44
pital Trust National Bank, where a back–to–back letter of credit was
involved. In Emery–Waterhouse, Hospital Trust National Bank
(HTNB) financed the business of a stove importer, Franklin. As security for the financing, Franklin gave HTNB rights to its accounts receivable, which were backed by letters of credit issued by banks of
Franklin’s customers. Emery, a Franklin customer, arranged with its
own bank, First National Bank of Boston (FNBB), to provide Franklin with a standby letter of credit guaranteeing Emery’s purchases.
The credit stated that to draw upon it Franklin must present FNBB
with a signed statement that “the amount of your draft represents
funds due as a result of the failure of the Emery–Waterhouse company to pay invoices within its terms, that demand for payment has

their discussions, they could serve as an indication showing what kind of terms and standards
courts are more likely to use in the United States.
42. Ross P. Buckley, The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 6 J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 77, 97 n.278 (1995).
43. If the intention of the beneficiary to defraud had not been proven, NMC Enterprises
might have been well treated as “a breach of warranty matter.” See Report of the Task Force
on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, An Examination of UCC Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 45 BUS.
LAW. 1521, 1614 (1990).
44. 757 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1985).
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been made, and that payment has not been received by you from the
Emery–Waterhouse Company or any other source.”45
When Franklin became insolvent, HTNB took it over and asked
an individual, Donnelly, to call upon letters of credit that named
Franklin as a beneficiary. Donnelly presented three drafts to FNBB
with documents apparently complying with the terms of the credit.
FNBB honored two of them immediately, then held up the third and
notified Emery. Emery told both HTNB and Franklin that it did not
owe the money. Franklin’s Chief Executive Officer told HTNB that
Emery did not owe the money. HTNB’s own investigation found the
same result. Donnelly told HTNB that it was wrong to draw the
drafts on Emery in such circumstances. HTNB nonetheless continued
to press for payment and refused to return any of the money obtained.
Emery brought an action to recover the money paid, claiming
that it owed nothing to Franklin and that HTNB’s call was fraudulent.
The trial court agreed and awarded the plaintiff punitive damages.
HTNB appealed. Affirming the judgment of the trial court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed:
Hospital Trust Bank argues that, even if the record contains facts
showing a “fraudulent” document or “fraud in the transaction,” we
must pretend that it does not because the jury refused to find Hospital Trust Bank liable on Emery’s separate charge of common law
fraud. The elements of “common law fraud” as charged by Emery,
however, are significantly different from the elements of fraud in the
statutory letter–of–credit exception. Even if we assumed that both
required some showing of a “false” statement, common law fraud
as charged by Emery also requires a showing that Emery “justifia46
bly relied” upon the false statement.

This is one of the most important cases with respect to the development of the notion of fraud under the fraud rule. It is clear that the
beneficiary called on the letter of credit with “absolutely no basis in
fact,” but the court did not use “egregious fraud” or similar terms that
arguably reflect an overly rigid attitude towards the fraud rule. Nor
did the court use the term “intentional fraud,” although the beneficiary knowingly called on the letter of credit without a legitimate basis.
It chose instead to use the phrase “statutory letter of credit exception,” an expression proper and responsive to the special characteris-

45. Id. at 402.
46. Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
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tics of letters of credit. This can be branded as a new page in the development of the standard of fraud in the fraud rule.
4. Flexible Standard. The term “flexible standard” was used in
47
United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., where Cambridge contracted to buy boxing gloves from Duke. Duke arranged
with United Bank and another Pakistani bank to finance the sale.
Cambridge was asked by the financing banks to cover the payment of
the purchase price by opening an irrevocable letter of credit with its
bank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company. Manufacturers
Hanover issued the letter of credit. When the shipments arrived, inspection revealed Duke had shipped “old, unpadded, ripped and mildewed gloves rather than the new gloves” Cambridge required.48
Cambridge commenced an action against Duke, joining Manufacturers as a party, obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting the issuer
from paying the drafts, and, subsequently, levied on the funds subject
to the credit.
The Pakistani financing banks instituted proceedings to vacate
the levy and to obtain payment of the drafts, claiming they were
holders in due course of the drafts and hence were entitled to the
proceeds thereof irrespective of any defenses against the beneficiary.
In refusing the petitioners’ request, the New York Court of Appeals
observed:
It should be noted that the drafters of section 5–114, in their attempt to codify the Sztejn case and in utilizing the term “fraud in
the transaction,” have eschewed a dogmatic approach and adopted
a flexible standard to be applied as the circumstances of a particular
situation mandate. It can be difficult to draw a precise line between
cases involving breach of warranty (or a difference of opinion as to
the quality of goods) and outright fraudulent practice on the part of
the seller. To the extent, however, that Cambridge established that
Duke was guilty of fraud in shipping, not merely nonconforming
merchandise, but worthless fragments of boxing gloves, this case is
49
similar to Sztejn.

Factually, as mentioned by the court, this case resembles Sztejn. It
might be argued that the court in Cambridge Sporting Goods itself
takes a “dogmatic approach” towards the issue of fraud in advocating
a “flexible standard” of fraud under the fraud rule. Nevertheless, it

47. See 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 271 (N.Y. 1976).
48. Id. at 268.
49. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
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does set out the range of the flexibility: the degree of fraud is somewhere between “breach of warranty . . . and outright fraudulent practice.”50 At the extremes, if only a warranty is breached, the fraud rule
will not be brought to play; on the other hand, if “outright fraudulent
practice” is established, the fraud rule will certainly apply. Under
these guidelines, the relevant standard of fraud requires of the beneficiary’s misconduct something more serious than mere breach of
warranty.
This decision is laudable and the standard of fraud adopted is a
good one if it can be implemented because it exactly matches the
purpose of the fraud rule: the stopping of fraud in letter of credit
transactions without becoming enmeshed in simple contract disputes.
Because the standard is labeled “flexible,” however, it may be susceptible to misinterpretation and might be misapplied in practice in un51
anticipated “flexible” ways.
5. Constructive Fraud. The standard of constructive fraud was
suggested in Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & Southern Nat’l
52
Bank, where Dynamics, the plaintiff, and the Indian government entered into a contract whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter
defense–related equipment. The plaintiff agreed further to have the
defendant bank issue standby letters of credit by which the issuer
promised to pay drafts drawn by the Indian government, and accompanied by the Indian government’s certification in quite general terms
that Dynamics had failed to carry out certain of its obligations under
the underlying contract.
While part of the contract remained unperformed, war broke out
between India and Pakistan. The U.S. government announced an
embargo on military supplies to the region, thereby making further
delivery of the equipment impossible. The Indian government thereafter refused to pay for some of the supplies previously delivered and

50. See Note, Letters of Credit: Injunction As a Remedy for Fraud in UCC Section 5–114, 63
MINN. L. REV. 487, 500 (1979) (internal citations omitted).
51. The Task Force noted that “[m]ost of the cases favoring a flexible standard have nonetheless been supported by a showing of serious misconduct equivalent to the shipment of rubbish.” Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 1614. This result might be affected by the fact that
Prior U.C.C. Article 5 was silent with respect to the standard of fraud, however. Whenever the
“flexible standard” was quoted, it was read together with the facts of Cambridge Sporting
Goods. If the term “flexible standard” was used in a statute and courts had applied it without
reading the facts of Cambridge Sporting Goods, the situation might have been different.
52. 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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presented a draft accompanied by a certificate purporting to comply
with the terms of the letter of credit. The plaintiff filed a complaint
seeking an injunction to prevent the issuer from honoring the draft,
alleging that the certificate provided by the Indian government was
fraudulent in that the plaintiff had actually performed its obligations
under the contract. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the injunction and stated:
The law of “fraud” is not static and the courts have, over the years,
adapted it to the changing nature of commercial transactions in our
society. . . . [I]n a suit for equitable relief—such as this one—it is
not necessary that plaintiff establish all the elements of actionable
fraud required in a suit for monetary damages. . . . “[F]raud has a
broader meaning in equity and intention to defraud or to misrepresent is not a necessary element. Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court
of equity properly includes all acts, omissions and concealments
which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an
53
undue and unconscious advantage is taken of another.”

In accordance with this judgment, any conduct of the beneficiary that
breaks even an equitable duty may lead to the application of the
fraud rule. Such a standard of fraud is unquestionably too low, for it
neglects the nature of a letter of credit transaction, normally a commercial transaction between sophisticated parties who can and should
look after their own interests.
If the standard for the application of the fraud rule is set too low,
as in the instant case, it may lead to the abuse of the rule by the applicant. Temptation to abuse always exists: “[f]raud is, in practice, virtually the only defence available when one seeks to escape payment.
54
. . .” In the commercial world, there are almost limitless ways in
53. Id. at 998–99 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193–95
(1963)) (emphasis added). Because of this statement, Dynamics became the oft–quoted case for
the standard of “constructive fraud,” see, e.g., Fellinger, supra note 13, at 13; Ho Peng Kee, The
Fraud Rule in Letters of Credit Transactions, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE FINANCING 235, 246 (Christine Chinkin ed., 1983), or “ordinary breach of contract,” see,
e.g., United Trading Co. v. Allied Arab Bank, 1985(2) Lloyd’s Rep. 554, 561 (Ackner L.J.)
(C.A.). It should be noted, however, that because the court of Dynamics also made the statement that “the court views its task in this case as merely guaranteeing that India [the beneficiary] not be allowed to take unconscientious advantage of the situation and run off with plaintiff’s money on a pro forma declaration which has absolutely no basis in fact,” a statement cited
in many cases for the standard of “egregious fraud,” this case has occasionally been classified as
a case of “egregious fraud.” See Symons, supra note 13, at 338–81 (quoting Dynamics, 356 F.
Supp. at 999).
54. R. BERTRAMS, BANK GUARANTEES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 257 (2d ed. 1996).
Illegality can be another one, but cases are scarce in this respect. See, e.g., United City Mer-
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which an applicant’s bargain with a beneficiary may go sour. When
this happens, the applicant will be tempted to use every means to escape from its original bargain. Exploitation of the fraud rule may be
one of its choices. Not only is the risk of such abuse inherent, but the
signs of abuse have already appeared. As put by Bertrams:
Through the years, a huge volume of case law concerning the issue
of fraud has grown up . . . . It is only natural for the account party,
when the risk of a call has materialized, to claim that the demand
for payment in his case is indeed fraudulent. He may, therefore,
initiate proceedings in order to attempt to prevent payment and, of
course, it hardly matters whether he believes honestly or . . . with
55
little conviction, that the demand is totally unjustified.

If the standard of fraud is set too low so that the fraud rule is abused
and payment of letters of credit repeatedly disrupted, the inherent
commercial functions of the letter of credit instrument—such as
prompt payment, allocation of risks and shifting of the forum—will
disappear. In turn, this will ultimately vitiate the reliability and commercial utility of letters of credit. Accordingly, the standard of constructive fraud should be avoided.
6. Summary. As has been seen, Prior U.C.C. Article 5 cases
did not provide a consistent answer to the question of notion or standard of fraud. As Prior U.C.C. Article 5 was silent over what kind of
fraud could invoke the fraud rule, almost every Prior U.C.C. Article 5
case involving letter of credit fraud cited Sztejn as authority and, not
surprisingly, the standards of fraud adopted by the courts in those
cases were as divergent as the views already considered regarding the
position expressed in Sztejn. Some courts stuck to a strict and restrictive approach and adopted an egregious standard of fraud, while others were ready to take a much different approach, adopting a con-

chants v. Royal Bank of Canada, 1979(1) Lloyd’s Rep. 267 (Q.B.). For discussion about the illegality defense, see McLaughlin, supra note 2. In Australia, another defense, unconscionable
conduct within the meaning of section 51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974, has unfortunately
become available since the case of Olex Focas Pty. Ltd. v. Skodaexport Co. (V.S. Ct. 1996) 134
F.L.R. 331. For a discussion about Olex, see infra notes 123–128 and accompanying text.
55. BERTRAMS, supra note 54, at 257. According to Professor Kozolchyk, during the last
20 years, with the increasing abuse by beneficiaries of their power to demand payment of letters
of credit whose
literal tenor could be read to support such demands, courts and commentators had to
reassess the meaning of strictness in the letter of credit law. The judicial dilemma was
frequently perceived to be as serious as choosing between formalism and assumed certainty of the law on the one hand and equity and uncertainty on the other.
Boris Kozolchyk, Preface, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1982).
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structive standard of fraud. Still others fell somewhere between the
two extremes. This author has tried to place the mentioned standards
of fraud “on a continuum where the suggested standard ranges from,
at the one extreme, where fraud must be egregious, to the other extreme, a broader constructive fraud approach, where an intention to
defraud is not a necessary element.” 56 This is not an easy task, however. It may be easy to tell the difference of the level of fraud between the two extreme standards—the standard of egregious fraud
and the standard of constructive fraud—and people may also say that
the flexible standard of fraud is higher than the standard of constructive fraud because the breach of warranty is excluded under the former, but it is not easy to tell the difference between the standard of
intentional fraud and that of letter of credit fraud. If there is any difference, it may be that the former looks more to the state of mind of
the fraudster, while the latter emphasizes the severity of the effect of
fraud on the transaction.
C. Iranian Cases
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 gave rise to considerable litigation in the United States regarding standby letters of credit. These
cases are known as “the Iranian cases.” The Iranian cases raise novel
legal questions and prompt heated discussion upon a range of issues,
particularly the standard of fraud of the fraud rule, not only at that
57
time but also thereafter.
56. Kee, supra note 53, at 242. Kee mentioned four kinds of standards without including
the standard of “letter of credit fraud.”
57. For a list of U.S. cases, see Getz, supra note 17, at 248–52. Besides litigation, other
channels were created for U.S. companies to block payments under standby letters of credit.
On November 14, 1979, the President of the United States issued an executive order to block
the transfer of “the property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran.” Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed.
Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (quoted in Touche Ross & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 434 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980)). To implement the Order, the U.S. Treasury
promulgated the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, which at first allowed American issuing
banks to discharge their liabilities under their standby letters of credit by paying into blocked
accounts of the Iranian beneficiaries, but later directly blocked payment of the standby letters of
credit themselves. See Mark P. Zimmett, Standby Letters of Credit in the Iran Litigation: Two
Hundred Problems in Search of a Solution, 16 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 927, 941 (1984). On January 19, 1981, as part of the agreement to release the American hostages, the United States and
Iran agreed to establish the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal at the Hague, for claims and counterclaims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of Iranian nationals against the
United States. For a detailed treatment of the Tribunal, see Symposium, On The Iran–United
States Claims Tribunal, 16 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 667 (1984). For some articles about the Iranian cases, see Joseph D. Becker, Standby Letters of Credit and Iranian Cases: Will the Inde-
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The Iranian cases can be divided into two groups: pre–hostage
cases and post–hostage cases. The pre–hostage cases were decided
before hostages were taken at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran in November 1979, while the post–hostages cases were decided after that
event occurred. The post–hostage cases are extreme examples of how
the fraud rule, if the standard or concept of fraud is not clearly defined, can be misused by the parties and misapplied by the courts.
The facts of the Iranian cases were similar to one another. Prior
to the Iranian Revolution, the Imperial Government of Iran spent
billions of dollars modernizing the country. Many U.S. companies
58
poured into Iran on this gold rush and were awarded lucrative contracts by the Imperial Government. At the same time, they were required to procure independent guarantees, counter–guaranteed by
standby letters of credit, to secure the good performance of those
contracts or the return of advance payments. All transactions involved four parties—a U.S. company, an Iranian government agency,
an Iranian bank, and a U.S. bank. The U.S. company contracted with
the Iranian government agency to provide goods or services in Iran.
The contract required the U.S. company to provide for the Iranian
agency independent guarantees as above. The independent guarantees were issued by the Iranian bank and counter–guaranteed by
standby letters of credit issued by the U.S. bank in favor of the Iranian bank at the request of the U.S. company. In the event of a dispute the Iranian government agency would demand payment under
the guarantee from the Iranian bank, the Iranian bank would demand
payment under the standby letter of credit from the U.S. bank, and
the U.S. bank would in turn look to the U.S. company for reimbursement.
In the wake of the Iranian Revolution, U.S. companies, fearing
that the new Iranian regime would arbitrarily demand payment under
the letters of credit, flocked to U.S. courts, in most of the cases on the
grounds of fraud, to prevent the letters of credit from being paid and
their accounts from being charged. They had “only marginal success
pendence of the Credit Survive?, 13 UCC L.J. 335 (1981); Comment, Fraud in the Transaction:
Enjoining Letters of Credit during the Iranian Revolution, 93 HARV. L. REV. 992 (1980); Richard J. Driscoll, The Role Of Standby Letter Of Credit In International Commerce: Reflections
After Iran, 20 VA. J. INT’L L. 459 (1980); Getz, supra note 17; George Kimball & Barry A.
Sanders, Preventing Wrongful Payment of Guaranty Letters of Credit—Lessons from Iran, 39
BUS. LAW. 417 (1984); Reed, supra note 38; George Weisz & Jonathan I. Blackman, Standby
Letters of Credit after Iran: Remedies of the Applicant, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 355.
58. Driscoll, supra note 57, at 475.
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in the courts”59 in the pre–hostage cases. There were only two reported pre–hostage cases in which U.S. companies were granted preliminary injunctions, and they were soon vacated.60 In other pre–hostage cases, injunction motions were either denied, or only “notice
61
injunctions” were granted. For example, in American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran,62 a paradigm pre–hostage case
which “typifies the Iranian cases with regard to the facts, relief
63
sought, arguments raised, and results,” the court rejected the applicant’s claim of fraud because it failed to meet the test of intentional
fraud by showing the beneficiary had “evil intent” or “fraudulent intent to mulct” the applicant.64 In the post–hostage cases, in striking
contrast with pre–hostage cases, U.S. courts changed their attitudes
dramatically. They issued preliminary, and in some cases permanent,
injunctions when U.S. companies came back to them after the hostage
crisis. Payment of letters of credit in many cases was enjoined without an opinion. According to one commentator, out of 14 injunction
motions made in federal district courts, 12 were granted, and only two
were denied.65 Of those twelve enjoined cases, only three were issued
with written opinions, eight were decided without an opinion, and the
remaining case was decided without a formal written judgment. No–
opinion judgments were not limited to federal courts; a similar ap66
proach was taken by some of the state courts.
In those cases where an opinion was given, the reasons provided
were hardly convincing to letter of credit specialists. For example, in
67
Touche Ross & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Touche
had entered into a contract with the Ministry of War of the Imperial
Government to audit, examine, and review the financial aspects of
military contracts that various American contractors were performing
for the Government. To assure performance, Touche was required to
59. Zimmett, supra note 57, at 930.
60. Id. at 937.
61. Id. Notice injunctions were widely used in the Iranian cases. They were injunctions
under which plaintiffs were not seeking injunction of the payment, but only that they be given
notice prior to payment by the issuer so that they could investigate the facts and determine
whether the demand for payment was fraudulent. Id. at 938.
62. Bell Int’l, 474 F. Supp. at 420.
63. Driscoll, supra note 57, at 475.
64. For another pre–hostage case with a similar view, see KMW Int’l v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979).
65. Zimmet, supra note 57, at notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. 434 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
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provide by Bank Saderat 10 percent of the contract price as a performance guarantee, which was counter–guaranteed by a standby letter of credit issued by Manufacturers. The letter of credit was payable upon presentation of a sight draft together with documents
consisting of either Bank Saderat’s statement signed by one of its officers or its tested telex that Bank Saderat had made payment to the
Ministry of War pursuant to the guarantee.
There was a force majeure clause in the contract, under which
the contract could be voided if events of force majeure occurred. The
contract also provided that the bank guarantee would be released in
the event the contract was voided due to force majeure. After the
hostages were taken in Teheran, Touche invoked the force majeure
clause and cancelled the contract unilaterally. Nevertheless, Touche
was advised that Bank Saderat had made a demand on Manufacturers
68
for payment of the letter of credit.
Touche moved for a preliminary injunction pendente lite enjoining Manufacturers from making any payment under the letter of
credit, but it is not clear from the report when Touche made the
move, whether before or after the demand for payment was made,
69
and on what basis, whether fraud or something else. The Supreme
Court of New York granted the plaintiff’s motion, and said:
As a result [of the cancellation of the contract], the guaranty has
been released, and no legitimate call could be made on the guaranty or the letter of credit . . . .
As all financial institutions in Iran, including Bank Saderat, have
been nationalized, Bank Saderat is owned by the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Bank Saderat could not have legitimately paid on the
guaranty, as Bank Saderat would be simply paying itself. There70
fore, any call on the letter of credit would be fraudulent.

The court in Touche cited two grounds for its application of the fraud
rule. The first was the effect of the invocation of the force majeure
clause by the applicant. The soundness of this ground is questionable
on two fronts:

68. It is not clear why the issue of force majeure was not raised in the pre–hostage cases. It
is inconceivable, however, that there were no such clauses in them because the amount of
money involved was huge and the parties involved were sophisticated multinational corporations.
69. The report is relatively brief and many aspects of the case are not clear.
70. Touche Ross, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 577–78 (Schwartz, J.). Reading the word “guaranty” in
the report, it can be concluded that it is merely another word used for the term “independent
guarantee” under discussion.
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(1) It seems that the parties were in dispute over whether events
such as the Iranian Revolution were within the force majeure
clause, for one party invoked the clause and claimed that the
independent guarantee had been released while the other
party called on the independent guarantee in ignorance of it.
This raises the question of whether the case ought not to
have been decided on the basis of simple breach of contract
rather than fraud.
(2) Even if the independent guarantee were released under the
force majeure clause in the contract, it is doubtful whether
that release would automatically release the issuer’s obligation under the letter of credit, because there was no provision
for that in the letter of credit and the two were independent
71
under the law of letters of credit.
What has struck commentators most is the second ground for the
judgment: that nationalization of the Iranian institutions meant that
“any call” by the Iranian bank on the letter of credit would be
fraudulent because any payment made by the bank under the independent guarantee would not be legitimate. According to the logic of
this statement, the fraud rule may be applied by looking into the identity of the beneficiary, not at what the beneficiary has done. This
seems to take the fraud rule a very long way indeed from its pur72
pose.
While the Iranian cases were extreme cases arising from extreme
circumstances, the sudden change of attitude by the U.S. courts
shocked the letter of credit world and prompted commentators to ask
whether the post–hostage decisions were really “influenced by the
73
widespread sentiment that Iran should be punished.” Whatever the
71. Cf. Arthur Loke, Standby Letters of Credit and Performance Bonds: The Lesson of the
Iranian Experience, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCING 283, 289
(Christine Chinkin ed., 1983) [hereinafter CURRENT PROBLEMS]. For circumstances where
payment of a counter-guarantee may be stopped, see Article 19(2)(e) of the UNCITRAL Convention, available at http:www.uncitral.org/English/texts/payments/guarantees.htm (last visited
Mar. 2, 2003).
72. Bertrams noted that, in the post–hostage Iranian cases, not only the standard of fraud
was lowered, but all the other requirements for equitable relief such as the likelihood of success
were not as stringent as they should have been. See BERTRAMS, supra note 54, at 270–71, notes
58–61 and accompanying text.
73. Zimmett, supra note 57, at 946. See also Wofgang Freiherr von Marschall, Recent Developments in the Field of Standby Letters of Credit, Bank Guarantees and Performance Bonds,
in CURRENT PROBLEMS, supra note 71, at 260, 282 (“[T]he Iranian experience seems to be a
good illustration of the saying that hard cases make bad law. Cases deciding problems arising
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answer, the Iranian cases made abundantly plain that the fraud rule
needed urgent improvement by the provision of a proper definition or
standard of fraud.
D. Revised U.C.C. Article 5 Position
1. Observations and Recommendations of the Task Force. Before the revision of U.C.C. Article 5 was commenced, a task force was
formed to study the previous case law and make recommendations
for the revision. With respect to the standard of fraud implemented
in the U.S. courts when applying the fraud rule, the Task Force made
the following observations:
(1) The reported cases indicate a general agreement that the defense of fraud in the transaction must be based on serious
conduct that has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer’s obliga74
tions would no longer be served.
(2) The reported cases differ, in rhetoric if not result, as to
whether fraud in the transaction refers to “egregious fraud”
or “intentional fraud” or involves application of a flexible
fraud standard. Most of the cases favoring a flexible standard
have nonetheless been supported by a showing of serious
misconduct equivalent to the shipment of rubbish.75
(3) The “fraud-in-the-transaction” defense has generally been
construed to require proof of an active intent and proof of no
colorable or plausible basis under the underlying contract for
76
the beneficiary to call the credit.
The Task Force further observed that “[n]ot every instance of
misconduct by the beneficiary should interrupt payment or excuse
honor of a letter of credit. Ordinary contract disputes must be settled
by the beneficiary and applicant between themselves and entirely
77
apart from the credit obligation.” It agreed with the position taken
out of the Iranian revolution should be examined carefully and it should always be asked
whether their reasoning is generally acceptable or whether the judge may have acted with a
mind influenced by a recent television-picture of a commercially irresponsible Ayatollah.”) (internal citations omitted).
74. Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 1613 (citing Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust
Bank, 336 A.2d 316, 324 (Pa. 1975)).
75. Id. at 1614 (internal citations omitted).
76. Id. at 1613 (internal citations omitted).
77. Id. at 1614.
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by the court in Emery–Waterhouse: “letter of credit fraud—i.e., conduct warranting judicial interference—is not the same as common law
fraud.”78 The Task Force stated however, that “[h]ow to formulate
79
the requisite fraud standard is not easy” because there is a “grey
area of misconduct which is wrongful but not so serious as to justify
interruption”80 of the normal operation of the letter of credit. The
Task Force pointed out:
Because of the serious possibility of confusion of letter of credit
fraud with common law fraud and other types of fraud as well as
the critical importance of a narrowly gauged standard, the Task
Force believes that an attempt must be made to alert parties and
81
courts that not just any fraud will suffice.

The Task Force finally recommended that a different standard
82
should apply for commercial letters of credit as opposed to standbys.
For commercial letters of credit, the focus should be whether “the
purpose of the underlying transaction must be rendered virtually
83
without value,” while for standby letters of credit, the question
should be “whether the drawing has occurred with no colorable basis
84
whatsoever.”
2. The Position in the Statute. The Drafting Committee, after
deliberating upon the Task Force’s recommendations and after extensive discussion and consultation, set forth a legal standard of fraud for
letters of credit in Revised U.C.C. Article 5. Revised U.C.C. Article
5, Section 109, reads:
(a) If . . . a required document is forged or materially fraudulent, or
honor of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by
the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant, . . . the issuer, acting
in good faith, may honor or dishonor the presentation . . . .
(b) If an applicant claims that a required document is forged or
materially fraudulent or that honor of the presentation would
facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or
applicant, a court of competent jurisdiction may temporarily or

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1615.
Id.
Id. at 1614.
Id. at 1615.
Robert S. Rendell, Fraud and Injunctive Relief, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 113 (1990).
Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 1615.
Id.
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permanently enjoin the issuer from honoring a presentation or
85
grant similar relief against the issuer or other persons.

Revised U.C.C. Article 5 adopted “material fraud” as the standard of
fraud under the fraud rule. While the Article itself does not define
86
“material fraud,” the Official Comment on Section 109 has made
some effort to explain it. For commercial letters of credit, it indicates
that material fraud “requires that the fraudulent aspect of a document
be material to a purchaser of that document or that the fraudulent act
87
be significant to the participants in the underlying transaction.” An
example has been provided to illustrate the point:
Assume . . . the beneficiary has a contract to deliver 1,000 barrels of
salad oil. Knowing that it has delivered only 998, the beneficiary
nevertheless submits an invoice for 1,000 barrels. If two barrels in a
1,000 barrel shipment would be an insubstantial and immaterial
breach of the underlying contract, the beneficiary’s act, though possibly fraudulent, is not materially so and would not justify an injunction. Conversely, the knowing submission of those invoices
88
upon delivery of only five barrels would be materially fraudulent.

For standby letters of credit, the Official Comment states that
“[m]aterial fraud by the beneficiary occurs only when the beneficiary
has no colorable right to expect honor and where there is no basis in
89
fact to support such a right to honor.” For further illustration, it
quotes the following passage from Ground Air Transfer v. Westates
Airlines:
We have said throughout that courts may not “normally” issue an
injunction because of an important exception to the general “no
injunction” rule. The exception, as we also explained in Itek, concerns “fraud” so serious as to make it obviously pointless and unjust to permit the beneficiary to obtain the money. Where the circumstances “plainly” show that the underlying contract forbids the
beneficiary to call a letter of credit; where they show that the contract deprives the beneficiary of even a “colorable” right to do so;
where the contract and circumstances reveal that the beneficiary’s
demand for payment has “absolutely no basis in fact”; where the
beneficiary’s conduct has “so vitiated the entire transaction that the

85. Revised U.C.C. Article 5, § 109 (emphasis added).
86. See also Paul S. Turner, Revised UCC Article 5: The New U.S. Uniform Law on Letters
of Credit, 11 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 205, 225 (1996).
87. Official Comment to Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code, para. 2.
88. Id.
89. Id. para. 3 (emphasis added).
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legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer’s obligation
90
would no longer be served.”

Neither Section 5–109 nor its Official Comment suggests that the
beneficiary’s intention to defraud should be proven, so it seems that
“material fraud” under Revised U.C.C. Article 5 looks “more to the
severity of the effect of the fraud on the transaction rather than the
91
state of mind of the beneficiary.” The thrust of Revised U.C.C. Article 5 is very encouraging. Section 5–109 of the Article has not only
laid down a standard of fraud in the law of letters of credit, but it has
also set forth a standard of “a unique kind of fraud”—“letter of credit
fraud,”92 a standard specially designed to fight fraud in that mercantile
specialty. In so doing, Revised U.C.C. Article 5 has accepted the
Task Force’s recommendations and has endorsed the approach espoused in the case of Emery–Waterhouse.
One aspect of the Official Comment is not entirely satisfactory,
however: the example provided for the illustration of the meaning of
the standard of fraud for standby letter of credit cases is not as typical
as it might be. In the example of Ground Air Transfer v. Westates
93
Airlines, Westates provided Charter One with planes and crew services for charter flights, and Charter One arranged for a standby letter
of credit to guarantee that Westates would not suffer harm should
Charter One fail to carry out its contractual obligations. It was
agreed that a copy of a ten–day default notice would be provided if
the letter of credit was to be called.
When a dispute arose and each party claimed that the other had
broken the contract, Charter One reacted by withholding certain fees
and, anticipating Westates’ draw on the letter of credit, sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin Westates from obtaining payment under
the credit. An injunction was issued by the trial court on the basis
that the beneficiary would be unlikely to win the underlying contract
94
dispute with the applicant. But the decision was reversed by the
First Circuit, because
Westates, the beneficiary, can truthfully say that it satisfied the letter of credit’s express conditions; it mailed a ten day notice to Charter One . . . . More importantly, since Westates has at least a “col90. Id. (quoting Ground Air Transfer v. Westates Airlines, 899 F.2d 1269, 1272–73 (1990)
(internal citations omitted)).
91. Buckley, supra note 42, at 97. See also Task Force Report, supra note 43, at 1615.
92. DOLAN, supra note 20, at 7–47.
93. 899 F.2d 1269 (1st Cir. 1990).
94. Id. at 1274.
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orable” claim that it acted lawfully under the contract in doing so,
Westates’ call would not fall within the traditional exception for
95
forgery or fraud.

Reading the facts, Ground Air Transfer is a typical case of a dispute
over a simple contract, which involved a possible call on a letter of
credit. There was no fraud at all in the case, let alone “material
fraud.” Yet an example that provides guidance for the understanding
of typical “material” fraud should be one in which fraud is not only
involved but also “material.”
3. Case Studies. Although the revision of Article 5 of the
U.C.C. was completed just seven years ago, it has already been
adopted by nearly all of the U.S. states and was first applied by U.S.
courts as early as September 1997. Nonetheless, the standard of fraud
96
set out in Section 5–109 of the Article has not often been tested.
In Western Surety Co. v. Bank of Southern Oregon,97 Western
Surety Company (WSC) issued performance bonds on behalf of
Black Oak Construction Company (BOC) for work BOC was performing in the State of Washington. WSC also issued performance
bonds for work BOC was performing in Oregon. To counter–guarantee the performance bonds, the defendant, the Bank of Southern
Oregon (the Bank), opened two letters of credit in favor of WSC.
The two letters of credit were essentially identical except for the serial

95. Id.
96. There may be a number of reasons for this. The main reason is that most of the cases
tried until recently were still applying Prior U.C.C. Article 5 because letters of credit involved in
those cases were issued before Revised U.C.C. Article 5 was adopted. Another reason may be
that “[t]he number of reported cases involving fraud declined significantly” following the promulgation of Revised U.C.C. Article 5. James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, Letters of Credit:
1995 Cases, 51 BUS. LAW. 1417, 1425 (1996). According to the two authors, the decline was one
of the “signs of the impact of the . . . revised U.C.C. Article 5.” Id. at 1418. This may be a reasonable observation because, by setting forth the standard of material fraud, Section 5–109 has
provided courts some guidance in dealing with cases of this kind, and has showed letters of
credit users that litigation reasons such as “constructive fraud” will not be supported. As a result, parties who might have used such reasons prior to the promulgation of Revised U.C.C. Article 5 may have stopped doing so. This author searched the LEXIS library “Federal and State
Cases” a number of times, the last on June 5, 2002. Only three cases were found. See MidAmerica Tire v. PTZ Trading Ltd. Import and Export Agents, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5402
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2000); New Orleans Brass v. Whitney Nat’l Bank and the La. Stadium
and Exposition Dist., La. App. LEXIS 1764 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. May 15, 2002); and W. Surety
Co. v. Bank of S. Or., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8863 (D. Or. June 9, 1999), aff’d, 257 F.3d 933 (9th
Cir. 2001).
97. W. Surety Co. v. Bank of S. Or., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8863 (D. Or. June 9, 1999),
aff’d, 257 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2001).
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number, the issuing date, the expiration date, and the aggregate
amount. When BOC defaulted on its project in Washington and the
performance bonds were called, WSC presented the Bank with drafts
under the letter of credit for payment. The Bank dishonored on the
basis that it believed one of the letters of credit was issued for the
project in Oregon and had nothing to do with the project in Washington.
WSC brought suit against the Bank for wrongful dishonor. Because the Bank could not prove that the letter of credit was limited to
a specific job, the court ruled for the plaintiff by applying the standard of “material fraud” set forth in Revised U.C.C. Article 5, Section 109, stating that:
The relevant Oregon statute provides that an issuing bank, acting in
good faith, may dishonor a draft on a letter of credit, if the presentation of the draft would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary. . . . However, fraud, as an affirmative defense to the obligation
under a letter of credit is to be narrowly construed. Fraud is not a viable defense if the beneficiary has even a colorable claim or any basis
98
in fact to funds from the letter of credit.

By so ruling, although the court claimed it was applying the standard of “material fraud” embodied in Section 5–109, its position was
similar to that adopted in the cases of “egregious” fraud considered
above.
In New Orleans Brass v. Whitney National Bank and the Louisi99
ana Stadium and Exposition District, New Orleans Brass (“Brass”)
applied for a standby letter of credit with the Whitney Bank in favor
of the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District (“LSED”) as a
guarantee for rental payments. A dispute arose about the rental
payments and LSED presented documents under the letter of credit.
Brass sought an injunction to prevent the honoring of the letter of
credit on the basis that the documents submitted contained false representations, and drawing on the letter of credit would cause irreparable injury, but its request was denied.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit because no “material fraud” as defined in Revised U.C.C. Article 5,
Section 109, was found in the case. In reaching its conclusion, the
court applied the standard of “material fraud” set forth in Revised
U.C.C. Article 5, Section 109, particularly as elaborated in the Offi-

98. Western Surety Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8863, at *10–*11.
99. 2002 La. App. LEXIS 1764 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. May 15, 2002).
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cial Comment, and cited the whole paragraph of Ground Air Transfer quoted above to the effect that the fraud rule can only be invoked
when the demand for payment has “absolutely no basis in fact” or the
beneficiary’s conduct has “so vitiated the entire transaction that the
legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer’s obligation
would no longer be served.”100 By so ruling, the court was taking a
similar position to that taken in Western Surety—an approach closely
resembling that employed in the “egregious” fraud cases.
In Mid-America Tire v. PTZ Trading Ltd. Import and Export
101
Agents, the dispute arose out of extensive negotiations for the purchase of Michelin tires by Mid-America Tire (MAT) and Jenco from
PTZ Trading Ltd. (PTZ) through agents of PTZ, financed by a letter
of credit. Throughout the negotiations, PTZ’s agents made specific
representations to the buyers as to the quantity, quality, and price of
the tires. When the agreement was made, the quantity, quality, and
price of the tires all failed to match what had been promised. The
buyers sought an injunction to prevent honor and payment of the letter of credit. The trial court granted the injunction on the basis that
the sellers’ agents had made material misrepresentations to the buyers.
The decision was reversed by the majority judgement on appeal,
however. The appellate court first asked: “how should ‘material
102
After lengthy discussions, it answered
fraud’ . . . be interpreted?”
that it “must be narrowly limited to situations of fraud in which the
wrongdoing of the beneficiary has . . . vitiated the entire transaction”103 and/or the demand for payment under the letter of credit “has
absolutely no basis in fact,”104 taking exactly the same approach to the
standard of fraud as adopted in the case of New Orleans. Justice Valen disagreed with the majority view, however, and stated:
By committing fraud, it is my opinion that PTZ violated its obligations of “good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care.” . . . [I]f
the beneficiary, PTZ, fails to act in good faith in its dealings and

100. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
101. 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5402, 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 964 (2000) (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
20, 2002) (Young, P.J.; Walsh, J. concurring, Valen, J. dissenting).
102. Id. at 972.
103. Id. at 979 (citing Roman Ceramics Corp. v. People’s Nat’l. Bank, 714 F.2d 1207, 1212
n.12 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 359; 336
A.2d 316, 324–25 (1975))); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
104. Id.
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perpetrates a fraud upon the applicant, MAT, the letter of credit
105
may be enjoined.”

By regarding the beneficiary’s violation of its obligation of “good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care” as the commitment of “material fraud,” Justice Valen seems, with respect, to have inadequately
advocated “an overly broad fraud exception . . . . Material fraud under revised U.C.C. Section 5–109 is explained in the official comments, and nowhere is that concept equated with the concept of ‘good
106
faith.’”
This short survey of cases reveals that the U.S. courts, in applying
the standard of “material fraud” embodied in Revised U.C.C. Article
5, appear to have generally taken a similar approach to the “egregious” fraud cases mentioned above. They have taken the position
that the fraud rule may only be applied in limited situations where the
demand for payment under the letter of credit “has absolutely no ba107
sis in fact.” This is “an unduly narrow” approach. It is more disturbing, however, to find that some judges have interpreted the standard of “material fraud” as equivalent to a violation of the obligation
of “good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care.” This is close to
the standard of “constructive fraud” mentioned above and utterly inappropriate. This indicates that divergent views as to the standard of
fraud may still appear in future in the United States although a uniform and appropriate standard of “material fraud” has been set forth
in Revised U.C.C. Article 5, Section 109.
II. THE POSITION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
English courts have traditionally adopted a relatively rigid and
narrow approach towards the application of the fraud rule, requiring
a high standard of proof of fraud: “clear,” “obvious,” or “established”
fraud known to the issuer. Accordingly, fraud has been very difficult
to establish in English courts. When no fraud is found to have been
committed in a transaction, there is no need for a court to consider
the standard of fraud or other specific issues relating to the application of the fraud rule. Since there have been only a limited number of
cases in which the fraud rule is applied, the discussion of what kind of
fraud can invoke the fraud rule has also appeared in just a few cases.
105. Id. at 989–90 (emphasis added).
106. James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, Letters of Credit: 2000 Cases, 56 BUS. LAW. 4
(2001), reprinted in ANNUAL SURVEY OF LETTER OF CREDIT LAW & PRACTICE 13, 18 (2002).
107. Id.
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In United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of
108
Canada, when considering the issue of third party fraud, Lord Diplock touched on the issue under discussion:
To this general statement of principle [of independence] as to the
contractual obligations of the confirming bank to the seller, there is
one exception: that is, where the seller, for the purpose of drawing
on the credit, fraudulently presents to the confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material representa109
tions of fact that to his knowledge are untrue.

According to Lord Diplock, material misrepresentation is the kind of
fraud that can invoke the fraud rule under the English law. Raymond
Jack has interpreted material misrepresentation as follows: the word
misrepresentation “is very close to a statement of the elements of
110
fraudulent misrepresentation which constitute the tort of deceit.”
The tort of deceit contains the following elements: “(1) knowing the
representation to be false; (2) without belief in its truth; or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.”111 The word “material”
means “material to the bank’s duty to pay, so that if the document
stated the truth the bank would be obliged to reject the documents,”112 which is close to the interpretation of material fraud in Official Comment on Revised U.C.C. Article 5, Section 109. Jack’s interpretation seems to be at odds with Lord Diplock’s own words,
however:
[T]he answer to the question: “to what must the misstatement in
the documents be material?” should be: “material to the price which
the goods to which the documents relate would fetch on sale if,
failing reimbursement by the buyer, the bank should be driven to
realise its security.” But this would not justify the confirming
bank’s refusal to honour the credit in the instant case; the realisable
value on arrival at Callao of a glass fibre manufacturing plant made
to the specification of the buyers could not be in any way affected
by having been loaded on board a ship at Flexistowe on December
113
16, instead of December 15, 1976.

In accordance with Lord Diplock, the misrepresentation should be
“material” to the real value of the goods. Predating the bill of lading
in the case was not considered material because it did not affect the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

(1979) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 267.
(1983) 1 A.C. 168, 183 (Diplock, L.J.) (emphasis added).
RAYMOND JACK ET AL., DOCUMENTARY CREDITS 196 (3d ed. 2001).
Id. at 197.
Id.
United City Merchants, 1 A.C. at 186.
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value of the goods. But according to Jack’s interpretation, predating
the bill of lading should be considered material because the bank
would have been obliged to reject the documents if the bill of lading
had stated the truth of the loading date. It is, with respect, submitted
that Jack’s interpretation is a far better statement of principle (though
not an accurate interpretation of Lord Diplock’s judgment) and Lord
Diplock’s observation is out of step with the wider law and practice of
letters of credit.
Lord Diplock’s observation in United City Merchants that material misrepresentation is the kind of fraud that can invoke the fraud
rule has been accepted by subsequent English cases. In Themehelp
114
Ltd. v. West, one of the few English cases where an injunction was
granted, the Court of Appeal followed the words of Lord Diplock
quoted above with respect to the standard of fraud and affirmed the
trial court’s decision.
In Banco Santander S.A. v. Bayfern Ltd.,115 the confirmer discounted the obligation of a deferred payment letter of credit before
its maturity. Shortly after the discounting, some of the documents
presented were found to be fraudulent. Subsequently, the issuer refused to pay the confirmer. The confirmer brought the action against
the issuer in the Queen’s Bench Division for reimbursement and
sought summary judgment, claiming it should be immune from the
fraud rule despite fraud. For trial of preliminary issues, fraud was assumed to have been established in the case. The trial court ruled for
the issuer on the basis of established fraud. On appeal, the decision
was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Both courts cited with approval
Lord Diplock’s above passage relating to the standard of fraud.
“Material misrepresentation” thus appears to have been settled
as the standard of fraud in the law governing letters of credit in the
United Kingdom. In language the English position is close to that of
the United States in Revised U.C.C. Article 5, Section 109: “material
fraud.” As both of them have not been sufficiently tested, it is too
early to make a reasonable comparison. If a comparison has to be
made, however, the difference between the two appears to be that the
U.S. position is enshrined in a statute, but the U.K. position is embodied in the common law. This may mean that courts in the United
States will “look more on the severity of the effect of the fraud on the

114. (1995) 4 All E.R. 215 (C.A.).
115. 1999 WL 250019 (Q.B. June 9, 1999), aff’d, 2000 WL 191098 (C.A. Feb. 25, 2000).
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transaction rather than the state of fraud of the beneficiary,”116 whilst
courts in the United Kingdom, at least if Jack is correct, will require
proof of the state of the mind of the fraudster. Be that as it may, with
the development of the fraud rule, the two systems are coming closer
together: lower standards of fraud such as “constructive fraud,” seem
to have been abandoned by U.S. courts following the promulgation of
Revised U.C.C. Article 5; and the more recent English cases to have
applied the fraud rule seem to be shifting from the traditional rigid
standard of proof, “established” or “clear” fraud, to the less rigid
standard of proof, “the only realistic inference . . . is that of fraud.”
III. THE POSITION IN CANADA
Canadian courts have generally focused on the standard of proof
rather than the standard of fraud when considering the application of
the fraud rule. When considering the kind of fraud that can invoke
the fraud rule, Canadian courts, like their English counterparts, are
likely to ask whether “clear or obvious” fraud or “a strong prima facie
case of fraud” has been shown, not how serious the fraud was in the
sense of the standard of fraud being discussed here. Canadian courts
have also considered whether the application of the fraud rule should
be confined to cases of forged or fraudulent documents or extend to
fraud in the underlying transaction. This is well illustrated by the case
of Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angelica–Whitewear Ltd.117
In Angelica–Whitewear, the court considered four issues with respect to the application of the fraud rule, but the standard of fraud
under discussion was not among them. When the court was considering the alleged fraud in the case, that is, the inflation of the prices in
the invoice by some 17 dollars per dozen above those agreed to in the
sales contract, it was not interested in how serious the fraud was, but
whether the fraud (1) had been “sufficiently established to the knowledge of the Bank before payment of the draft to make it clear or ob118
vious to the Bank,” and (2) could “be regarded as having made invoice 0014 a false document in so far as its representation of the
applicable prices was concerned, or whether it be regarded as fraud in
the performance of the underlying sales contract.”119 The court put
the question simply, was this “fraud of the kind that comes within the
116.
117.
118.
119.

Buckley, supra note 42, at 97.
[1987] 36 D.L.R. 161.
Id. at 178.
Id.
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fraud exception,”120 which seems to indicate that fraud is a simple
concept, the meaning of which is known by everybody in Canada.
Due to the general approach of the Canadian courts towards the
standard of fraud, the issue, even when it is mentioned in a Canadian
case, has normally been addressed in a very simple way. For exam121
ple, in CDN Research & Development Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia,
when issuing an injunction restraining the issuer from paying the demand, Justice Galligan stated:
It is my opinion, in this case, an injunction ought to be granted. In
my view, it ought to be granted for at least two reasons. The first is
that the plaintiff has made out a strong prima facie case that the
demand made by the agent of the Ministry of War is fraudulent.
Delivery has clearly been made and claim for a payment of a delivery guarantee necessarily implying that delivery was not made is
122
clearly untrue and false.

This issue has been said to have been “dealt with in some depth”123 in
the case of Cineplex Odeon Corp. v. 100 Bloor West General Partner,
124
In Cineplex, a limited partnership was formed to develop a
Inc.
multifunctional complex. The parties had entered into a number of
agreements, according to which the plaintiff, Cineplex, provided a letter of credit to secure its obligations under certain agreements. Cineplex defaulted in its obligation to build the project, and the letter of
credit was called upon. The plaintiff moved to enjoin payment,
claiming that it was not in default in the obligation that the letter of
credit was meant to guarantee, any draw by the defendants would be
fraudulent and thus the fraud rule should be applied. After reviewing
the facts and the principle of independence, before dismissing the
plaintiff’s motion, Justice Blair pointed out:
I pause at this point to note, in passing, a factor which occasionally
seems to be lost amidst the melee in these sorts of disputes, disputes which more and more are finding their way to the courts in
times of economic stress: the exception is “fraud”, not something
125
less than fraud.

Then he went on:

120. Id.
121. 18 C.P.C. 62 (Ont. High Ct. of Justice 1980).
122. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
123. S.P. Jeffery, Standby Letters of Credit: A Review of the Law in Canada, 14 BANKING &
FIN. L. REV. 505, 528 (1999).
124. 1993 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 43709 (Ont. Gen. Div. Jan. 19, 1993).
125. Id. para. 29.
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In the eyes of the party seeking to prevent payment on the letter of
credit, almost any conduct or position of the beneficiary which does
not accord with the aggrieved party’s view of the universe may appear to be fraud, and therefor justify non–payment. Such, of
course, cannot be the case, given the recognized characteristics of a
letter of credit. . . . Fraud is a straightforward five–letter word,
meaning just what it says: “fraud”. Fraud is not simply a legitimate
dispute or disagreement over the interpretation of a contract, however one–sided that dispute may appear. While the notion of fraud
may elude precise definition, it is a concept well–known to the law,
and it must, in my view, import some aspect of impropriety, dishonesty or deceit. . . . Fraud is not mistake, error in interpreting a contract; fraud is “something dishonest and morally wrong, and much
mischief is . . . done, as well as much unnecessary pain inflicted, by
its use where ‘illegality’ and ‘illegal’ are the really appropriate expressions.” Cases where the demand on the letter of credit can be
said to be “clearly untrue or false”, or “utterly without justification”, or where it is apparent there is “no right to payment”, all fall
within the foregoing principles and must be read in the context of
126
those “fraud” principles.

If this can be taken as a summary or generalization of the Canadian position on the standard of fraud, the Canadian position is
somewhat confusing or contradictory. As can be seen, the quoted
passage, on one hand, is saying that fraud in Canada means something of “dishonesty” or “deceit,” or “clearly untrue or false,” which
is similar to common law fraud, requiring the intention of the
fraudulent party. But on the other hand, it is saying that a call on the
letter of credit that is “utterly without justification” or “where it is
apparent there is ‘no right to payment’” can also mean fraud in Canada, which is similar to the American position, looking more to the
sharpness of the fraudulent conduct. This may be the true reflection
of the Canadian position, however: on one hand, being a country of
English tradition, understandably the Canadian courts traditionally
follow the approach of their English counterparts closely, adopting
the standard of common law fraud; on the other hand, the influence
of the U.S. position in the area of letter of credit law, can be seen everywhere in the world, and at least some of the Canadian courts are
also closely following the U.S. approach on these issues.

126. Id. paras. 30–32 (internal citations omitted).
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IV. THE POSITION IN AUSTRALIA
In Australia, in the small number of cases that have considered
the fraud rule, two kinds of standard of fraud have been suggested:
intentional fraud and gross equitable fraud.
A. Intentional Fraud
The standard of intentional fraud was set forth in the case of
127
Contronic Distributors Pty. Ltd. v. Bank of New South Wales. When
issuing the injunction, Justice Helsham said:
It seems to me that the case could be decided on a simple basis of
fraud. I think it is sufficient to enable . . . Balfour . . . , in any event
to get relief in these proceedings, to establish an intention to obtain
money by deceit on the part of GEC at the time that the letter of
credit is to be presented by it for payment. GEC would then be obtaining money by the use of documents it knew to be false and
128
which were brought into being by it and with its connivance.

B. Gross Equitable Fraud
The standard of gross equitable fraud was suggested in Hortico
129
(Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Energy Equip. Co. (Australia) Pty. Ltd.,
where Energy Australia had a contract with Hortico for the design,
supply, and installation of a boiler. Hortico arranged for the issuance
of a bank guarantee in favor of Energy Australia. Later the contract
was terminated by both parties and Energy Australia made a demand
on the guarantee for damages. Hortico brought the action to enjoin
the payment under the guarantee, alleging, inter alia, that the guarantee was contemplated only to be security for the performance of the
contract by the plaintiff and not also for damages, as the defendant
claimed.
The plaintiff’s argument was dismissed by Judge Young of the
Supreme Court of New South Wales. The respected judge said in
obiter, however:
[W]ith commercial transactions such as the present, the courts have
consistently taken a “hands off” approach, and it does not seem to
me that anything short of actual fraud would warrant this Court in
intervening, though it may be in some cases (not this one), the un-

127. (1984) 3 N.S.W.L.R. 110 (N.S.W. S.Ct.).
128. Id. at 114 (emphasis added). For more discussion of the case, see supra notes 90–93.
129. (1985) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 545 (N.S.W.S. Ct.).
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conscionable conduct may be so gross as to lead to exercise of the
130
discretionary power.

The view that gross equitable fraud might invoke the fraud rule was
restated some ten years later by the same justice in the case of Inflat131
In Inflatable, the
able Toy Co. v. State Bank of New S. Whales.
plaintiff, the buyer, ordered from the seller inflatable plastic toys to
be delivered in instalments and paid for by letters of credit. For one
instalment, some discrepancies appeared between the documentation
and the facts. The buyer accepted the discrepancies when the seller
told it what had happened, but changed its mind later and brought an
action to prevent the issuer from paying the accepted bill of exchange,
alleging that the seller was guilty of fraud in presenting documents,
which it knew to be untrue. Judge Young rejected the buyer’s claim.
But again as a passing dictum, after citing Sztejn, Hortico and other
cases relating to the fraud rule, he stated, “I should note, in case what
I said is read later too widely, that it is still wise to keep open the possibility that unconscionable conduct may be an exception.”132
The idea that gross equitable fraud may invoke the fraud rule
was rejected by Judge Batt of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Olex
133
Focas Pty. Ltd. v. Skodaexport Co., however. In that case, Olex Focas entered into a contract with Skodaexport for the supply and installation of telecommunications, telesupervisory and instrumentation
systems in connection with the construction of an oil pipeline in India.
Skodaexport was the head–contractor for the project, and Olex was
one of the subcontractors engaged by Skodaexport.
Skodaexport agreed to pay Olex what was termed mobilization/procurement advances for 15 percent of the contract price. As
security for the repayment of the advances, Olex was required to provide independent guarantees to Skodaexport, termed mobilization/procurement guarantees (mobilization guarantees). In addition,
Olex was required to provide another type of guarantee, termed performance guarantees, for 10 percent of the contract price, to secure
the good performance of its obligations under the underlying contract. All the guarantees were payable “at sight forthwith on first

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
(1994) 34 N.S.W.L.R. 243 (N.S.W.S. Ct.).
Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
(1996) 134 F.L.R. 331 (V.S. Ct.).
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demand . . . without protest or demur or proof.”134 Skodaexport was
allowed to call upon part of the guarantees.
When disputes arose, Skodaexport allegedly threatened to call
upon the full amount of the guarantees unless Olex would accept its
135
terms for the settlement of the disputes. By this time, the advances
secured by the mobilization guarantees had largely been repaid. The
plaintiffs also claimed that collectively 95 percent of the equipment
had been supplied and 78 percent of the design, construction, integration and commissioning services had been provided. Olex sought interlocutory injunctions to prevent the independent guarantees from
being paid on two grounds: (1) that Skodaexport, by threatening to
make demand on the guarantees, was acting fraudulently, without a
belief that it was entitled to the sums secured by the guarantees; and
(2) that Skodaexport, by threatening to call up the guarantees, was
committing unconscionable conduct within the meaning of Section
51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
Judge Batt, when considering the plaintiff’s first basis, followed
the traditional line of English cases requiring a high standard of proof
and, at the beginning of his analysis, stated:
Now in Victoria, as in England, the law is clear. The principle is
clearly established that payment by a bank and a demand therefor
by a beneficiary under an unconditional performance bond or
guarantee, as under a confirmed irrevocable letter of credit, will not
be restrained except in a clear case of fraud, of which the bank is
clearly aware at the time of, probably, the proposed payment, or in
the case of forgery of documents (which is probably applicable only
to letters of credit) or, perhaps, in the case of illegality of the un136
derlying contract.

Then the learned Judge Batt considered a number of English and
Australian cases, cited long quotations from them to the effect that
137
only clear fraud could activate the fraud rule, and rejected the plain-

134. Id. at 340 (for mobilization guarantees) and 342 (for performance guarantees).
135. In fact Skodaexpert instructed its bank, the Czechoslovakian Commercial Bank, to call
up all of the guarantees, and the bank did so. Id. at 345. For more information on proceedings
in the case and a detailed summary of the beneficiary’s call on the guarantees, see Ross P.
Buckley, Sections 51AA and 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: The Need for Reform, 8
TRADE PRAC. L.J. 5, 6 n.6 (2000).
136. Olex, 134 F.L.R. at 348 (emphasis added). For a comment on this passage, see Alan L.
Tyree, Performance Bonds and Section 51AA of the Trade Practices Act, 8 J. BANKING & FIN. L.
& PRAC. 338, 339 (1997).
137. See, e.g., Edward Owen Eng’g Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Int’l Ltd., (1978) 1 All E.R. 976
(C.A.); and Bolivinter Oil S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, (1984) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 251 (C.A.).
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tiffs’ request for injunction on the basis of fraud. When considering
the point espoused by Judge Young in Hortico that gross equitable
fraud might invoke the fraud rule, Judge Batt said:
In my view his Honour was speaking in very guarded terms, prefacing his mention of that concept by reference to the general
“hands–off” approach taken by courts with respect to commercial
transactions. . . . I would not with respect, having regard to all the
other cases I have cited, treat gross unconscionability falling short of
138
actual fraud as a ground for an injunction.

138. Olex, 134 F.L.R. at 354 (emphasis added). Remarkably, Judge Batt enjoined the payment of the mobilization guarantees on the basis of the plaintiffs’ second argument: Skodaexport’s calling up the guarantees was committing unconscionable conduct within the meaning of
section 51AA of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Austl.). This ruling has “surprised most commentators, and the criticism of it has been direct and frequent.” See, e.g., Buckley, supra note
135, at 6. By and large, criticism so far has focused on the point that the decision has misapplied
section 51AA of the Trade Practices Act and “the accepted scope of the section may have been
broadened considerably.” Ross P. Buckley, Unconscionability Amok, or Two Readily Distinguishable Cases?, 26 AUST. BUS. L. REV. 323, 326 (1998). This approach also represents an undesirable development in the law of letters of credit, however, because it appears to have created another basis for the interference with the payment of letters of credit and independent
guarantees at least in Australia: statutory unconscionable conduct, which may severely affect
the commercial utility of letters of credit because “[t]he effect of the statute, applying as it does
to international trade and commerce, is to work a substantial inroad into the well–established
common law autonomy of letters of credit and performance bonds and other bank guarantees.”
Olex, 134 F.L.R. at 358. More alarmingly, this decision may have opened a “Pandora’s box” in
Australia and led to more “exceptions” to the letter of credit payment system. For example,
other sections of the Trade Practices Act, such as section 52, dealing with misleading and deceptive conduct, and section 53 dealing with false or misleading representations, may also be applied in future to letters of credit and independent guarantees. If this happens, the commercial
utility of letters of credit and independent guarantees will be seriously eroded. For a series of
articles criticizing this ruling, see the interaction of section 51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth.) (Austl.) which provides that “[a] corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in
conduct that is unconscionable within the meaning of the unwritten law, from time to time, of
the States and Territories” with the fraud exception is yet to be clarified in Australia. For the
first, quite possibly incorrect clarification attempt, see Olex, 134 F.L.R. at 331. For further
comment on this case, see Robert Baxt, Are Bank Guarantees Safe from the Unconscionable
Conduct Provisions of the Trade Practices Act?, in THE AUSTRALIAN BANKER 62 (1997); Robert Baxt, A Bombshell on Unconscionable Conduct, 25 AUSTRALIAN BUS. L. REV. 227 (1997);
Robert Baxt, Unconscionability Taken One Step Too Far?, 25 AUSTRALIAN BUS. L. REV. 301
(1997); Robert Baxt, Unconscionable Conduct under Trade Practices Act, 71 AUSTRALIAN L.J.
432 (1997); Robert Baxt and Joel Mahemoff, Unconscionable Conduct Under the Trade Practices Act—An Unfair Response By the Government: A Preliminary View, 26 AUSTRALIAN BUS.
L. REV. 5, 13–15 (1998); Jeffrey Browne, The Fraud Exception to Standby Letters of Credit in
Australia: Does it Embrace Statutory Unconscionability?, 11 BOND L. REV. 98 (1999); Ross P.
Buckley, Sections 51AA and 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974: The Need for Reform, 8
TRADE PRAC. L.J. 5 (2000); Alan Tyree, Performance Bonds and Section 51AA of the Trade
Practices Act, 8 J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 338 (1997); Warren Pengilley, Unconscionability: Are the Litigation Floodgates Opening in Relation to Commercial Transactions?, 13 TRADE
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Therefore, in Australia to date, while two kinds of misconduct that
may invoke the fraud rule have been suggested, only “intentional
fraud” has been applied. As for gross equitable fraud, it has been
mentioned twice by the same justice in obiter in the Supreme Court
of New South Wales, but has not been applied in any case. Moreover,
it has been rejected by the Supreme Court of Victoria. Whether the
standard of gross equitable fraud can become a real ground for the
application of the fraud rule in Australia remains to be seen.
V. THE POSITION UNDER THE UNCITRAL CONVENTION
The United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees
and Standby Letters of Credit (the UNCITRAL Convention) has
taken a different approach to fraud from that of Revised U.C.C. Article 5. While the latter has provided a general standard of fraud for
the application of the fraud rule—material fraud—the former has
139
avoided the “terms ‘fraud’ and ‘abuse of right’” and identified in
Article 19 three substantive grounds to invoke the fraud rule:
(a) Any document is not genuine or has been falsified;
(b) No payment is due on the basis asserted in the demand and the
supporting documents; or
(c) Judging by the type and purpose of the undertaking, the de140
mand has no conceivable basis.

As for demands that have “no conceivable basis,” Article 19(2)
of the Convention further refined this aspect as follows:
(a) The contingency or risk against which the undertaking was designed to secure the beneficiary has undoubtedly not materialized;
(b) The undertaking obligation of the principal/applicant has been
declared invalid by a court or arbitral tribunal, unless the undertaking indicates that such contingency falls within the risk to
be covered by the undertaking;
(c) The underlying obligation has undoubtedly been fulfilled to the
satisfaction of the beneficiary;
(d) Fulfilment of the underlying obligation has clearly been prevented by wilful misconduct of the beneficiary; or

PRAC. L. BULL. 11 (1997); and Ben Zillmann, A Further Erosion Into the Autonomy of Bank
Guarantees, 13 BLDG. & CONSTR. L. 354, 357 (1997).
139. Eric E. Bergsten, A New Regime For International Independent Guarantees and Stand–
By Letters Of Credit: The UNCITRAL Draft Convention On Guaranty Letters, 27 INT’L LAW.
859, 872 (1993).
140. UNCITRAL, art. 19.
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(e) In the case of a demand under a counter–guarantee, the beneficiary of the counter–guarantee has made payment in bad faith
as guarantor/issuer of the undertaking to which the counter–
guarantee relates.

This list may not be exhaustive, but it is an impressive and encouraging way in which to define the kind of misconduct that may invoke
the fraud rule. It undoubtedly stands as the most detailed provision
so far with respect to clarification of the misconduct that may bring
the fraud rule into play. These provisions are “clear and narrow in
141
scope and provide an excellent international standard.” They will
undoubtedly provide good guidance for courts to enhance their application of the fraud rule.
While the Convention requires “manifest and clear” evidence to
invoke the fraud rule, it does not mention that the wrongdoer’s intention should be proven. Reading the text, the Convention, like Revised U.C.C. Article 5, seems to emphasize more the nature of the
misconduct rather than the fraudster’s state of mind. Having rules is
one thing, however, properly implementing them is another, because
implementation of the rules is in the hands of individual courts. As
courts may still apply the standard of proof of some English judgments, the real value of these rules remains to be seen.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fraud rule is “the most controversial and confused area”142 in
the law governing letters of credit, mainly because the standard of
fraud is hard to define. The divergent views expressed by courts and
commentators with respect to the essence of the standard of fraud reflect the tension between two different policy considerations: “the
importance to international commerce of maintaining the principle of
the autonomy of documentary credits . . . and the importance of dis143
couraging or suppressing fraud in the letter of credit transaction.”

141. Comment 1, Litigation Digest: Agritrade Int’l Pte. Ltd. v. Industrial & Commercial Bank
of China, [1998] 3 S.L.R. (Singapore), 4(3) DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WORLD 8, 12 (2000).
142. Comment, Fraud in the Transaction: Enjoining Letters of Credit during the Iranian
Revolution, supra note 57, at 995.
143. See Bank of Nova Scotia, [1987] D.L.R at 168. For a typical view favoring a stringent
rule, see Henry Harfield, Identity Crisis In Letter of Credit Law, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 239 (1982):
“The rigid rules that govern letters of credit are structural. If they are subordinated to more
pliable precepts appropriate to equitable resolution of disputes, the very existence of the letter
of credit as a useful business device can be destroyed as surely as a wisteria vine can strangle an
oak.”
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On the one hand, if fraud is defined too widely or the standard of
fraud is set too low, the fraud rule may be abused by an applicant who
does not want the issuer to pay the credit simply because it will not
profit from the underlying transaction. If obstruction of payment of a
letter of credit is permitted too often, business confidence in letters of
credit as effective performance assurances will be destroyed.144
On the other hand, if fraud is defined too narrowly or the standard of fraud is set too high, the effectiveness of the fraud rule will be
compromised. A very rigid standard of fraud may encourage the
growth of fraudulent conduct by beneficiaries, discourage the use of
letters of credit by applicants and ultimately harm the commercial
145
utility of letters of credit.
A proper standard of fraud should therefore be one reflecting a
sensible compromise between the competing interests. Legally, it
should serve the purpose of the fraud rule and be workable for the
courts. Commercially, it should facilitate the utility of letters of
credit. Based on these considerations, extreme concepts or standards
of fraud, such as egregious fraud, which may be too rigid, and constructive fraud, which may lead to the fraud rule being abused, should
be avoided, and a proper and practical standard of fraud should be
adopted.
A combination of the provisions of Revised U.C.C. Article 5,
Section 109, and those of Article 19 of the UNCITRAL Convention,
provides the best solution yet devised, to defining the limits of the
fraud exception. Under Revised U.C.C. Article 5, Section 109, “material fraud” may invoke the fraud rule. As considered above, the
standard of material fraud has not only avoided extreme ideas such as
egregious fraud and constructive fraud but also has reflected the
unique nature of letters of credit. Because “material” is a general
term, however, the implementation of the standard of material fraud
provided in Article 5 remains uncertain despite some guidance provided by the case law, because different courts may interpret it divergently, as they have interpreted Sztejn. This uncertainty may to some
extent be reduced by recourse to the provisions of Article 19 of the
UNCITRAL Convention, however, where a detailed list of the types
of misconduct that constitute material fraud has been provided. The
144. R.J. Gavigan, Wysko Investment Co. v. Great American Bank: A New Attack on the
Usefulness of Letters of Credit, 14 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 184, 202 (1993).
145. Cf. Stephen J. Leacock, Fraud in the International Transaction: Enjoining Payment of
Letters of Credit in International Transactions, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 899 (1984).
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misconduct listed in the Convention provides substantial practical
guidance to courts and letter of credit users. Accordingly, if the fraud
rule can be formulated in a way that combines the standard of material fraud embodied in Section 109, as a general standard, with the
provisions of Article 19 of the UNCITRAL Convention as detailed
examples, the predictability of the rule will be greatly enhanced.
The best place for the fraud rule to be so formulated is in the
terms of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Cred146
its —the influential rules for letters of credit that are incorporated
by reference into virtually all credits issued worldwide. The publisher
of the UCP, the International Chamber of Commerce, is the most
qualified body to prescribe the fraud rule as it has the greatest expertise in letters of credit matters.147
As the UCP is, in form, merely a set of contractual terms, whatever provisions it might include regarding fraud would be subordinate
148
to local law on the issue. There is no reason to expect that courts
would not give to UCP provisions on fraud the same weight they have
given to its other provisions, however. After all, the UCP prescribes
the doctrine of autonomy,149 so why should it not also prescribe the
exception and limits to the doctrine?
It is hoped that in the next revision of the UCP, the revision
committee will choose to deal with the issue of fraud, and, in doing so,
will take its lead from the U.C.C. and the UNCITRAL Convention.
If the UCP embraces the law on fraud as set forth in Section 5–109 of
the U.C.C., as amplified by the definition of fraud from Article 19 of
the UNCITRAL Convention, the result will be a highly workable ju-

146. ICC Publication No. 500, supra note 5. The UCP is essentially a set of standard terms
for banks drafted by bankers. The Working Group that prepared the latest revision was the first to
include members other than bankers, in this case a number of bank lawyers and two law professors.
The parties documentary credits serve, exporters and importers, are not directly represented in the
drafting process. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., The Arrival of International Private Law, 25 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 477, 492 (1992).
147. Courts in most jurisdictions outside the United States are inexperienced with letters of
credit, and the litigation of fraud under letters of credit is rare outside the United States. Accordingly, there has been no opportunity elsewhere to develop a sophisticated and coherent
body of case law on the issue of fraud in letters of credit. England has a sophisticated and well–
developed jurisprudence on letter of credit law in general, but not on the fraud issue in particular.
148. Robert Wight & Alan Ward, The Liability of Banks in Documentary Credit Transactions under English Law, J. INT’L BANKING LAW. 387, 390 (1998).
149. Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 1993 Revision, International
Chamber of Commerce Publication No. 500, arts. 3, 4.
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risprudence that will serve to enhance the commercial utility of letters
of credit and limit their use to perpetrate fraud.

